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NOTES AND COMMENTS
HOST LIABILITY FOR CIVIL DAMAGE UNDER DRAM SHOP ACT
The exigencies of modern business appear to be responsible for the
phenomena commonly called the "Office Christmas Party" and the Trade
Shows and Industrial Conventions, "Hospitality Suites." Stories con-
cerning these events are without number. It is no great secret that new
customers are "won," deals are closed, and that employer-employee rela-
tionships are enhanced at these so-called "social" gatherings. A "party"
today generally entails some form of liquid refreshment. If, as is gen-
erally the case, the liquid refreshment at such affairs takes an alcoholic
form, some peculiar legal problems may arise over the liability of the
host in the event that a guest becomes inebriated and does harm to other
individuals.
Out of such a set of circumstances and in face of the Liquor Control
Act,' a non-commercial dispenser of liquor may find itself exposed to civil
damages, despite the fact that the ostensible purpose of its entertainment
was "social." The attempt here is to evaluate the prospect of recovery
against a corporate host under the so-called Illinois Dram Shop Act.
2
Section 135 of the present Liquor Control Act is the lineal descendant
of Section 9 of the original Dram Shop Act of 1874. 3 The present Civil
Damage Section, 135, has been in force, substantially unchanged, for over
86 years, even during the Prohibition Era.4 When re-enacted in 1934,
after the repeal of Prohibition, it became readily apparent that the older
cases were stare decisis upon similar questions.5
Under older cases, courts have been prone to construe the Civil Dam-
age Section of the Act strictly,6 but cases arising subsequent to its re-
enactment appear to be more in harmony with the statement of legislative
intent, which reads as follows: "This Act shall be liberally construed, to
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
2 The Liquor Control Act has been commonly called the Dram Shop Act by
virtue of the fact that a liquid containing alcohol is also called a dram.
3 The Dram Shop Act of 1874 was entitled "An Act to Provide for the Licensing
of and Against the Evils Arising from the Sale of Intoxicating Liquors." Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1874, § 9, p. 438. The present Act is titled: "An Act Relating to Alcoholic
Liquors."
4 A concise history of the Civil Damage Section of the Liquor Control Act appears
in Smith-Hurd, Ill. Ann. Stat., Chs. 4-3-45, § 135.
5 See, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 31 (1939).
6 Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73 (1889).
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the end that the health, safety and welfare of the people of the State of
Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic
liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and
regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors." 
7
(Italics added.)
As indicative of the legislative intent, modern cases have construed the
Civil Damage Section as "remedial" and to be construed so as to "sup-
press the mischief involved in the reckless dispensing of alcoholic bever-
ages." 8  Writers on this subject have concluded "in fact there is no
fundamental reason why a broad and liberal construction should not
control. "9
Bearing in mind a trend toward greater liberalization of the Civil
Damage Section of the Act, a suitor seeking to impose liability against
a non-commercial dispenser such as a corporate host is faced with the
immediate problem of coming within the terms of the Statute. On the
surface the problem would appear easy to overcome, because of the plain
and ordinary meaning of the Statute, which says: "Every person, who shall
be injured, in person or property by an intoxicated person, shall have a
right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any
person or persons who shall, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, have
caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person; . . .,,'o
(Italics added.)
However, in view of cases arising under this section, the aggrieved
party's case appears to be easily attacked by the defendant's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a case upon which relief can be granted."
The nexus of a defendant's motion to dismiss will undoubtedly con-
tain an argument that a non-commercial donor of alcoholic beverages is
not liable ;12 that the entire Liquor Control Act has no effect upon those
in no way connected with the traffic of liquors ;13 or that in absence of
statute it is not a tort to sell or give intoxicating liquor.
14
The question of liability under the Act of persons other than a com-
mercial dispenser of alcoholic intoxicants was first raised in the case of
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 94.
8 Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks Lodge No. 281, 309 Ill. App. 145,
33 N. E. (2d) 161 (1941).
9 See note 5, ante.
10 See note 1, ante.
11111. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 110, § 45(1).
12 See note 6, ante.
13 See note 6, ante.
14 Meldel v. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241 (1874).
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Albrecht v. People.15 There a suit was filed against a brewery owner who
served beer from his brewery to an individual who had come to his home
seeking to purchase real property. The court refused to convict the
defendant of disbursement of alcoholic beverage in violation of the Dram
Shop Act, saying in its opinion: "The opposing testimony . . . shows quite
conclusively . . . that the beer was sent for to the brewery and offered by
the defendant to his visitor as an act of hospitality to neighbors and
friends .... It has nothing of the odor of a Dram Shop about it, and was
but a mere courtesy, which this law was not designed to reach. "16
A similar result was reached in People v. Kryl, 17 in which the court
took the position that the laws relating to Dram Shops are to pertain
only to those persons directly or indirectly involved in the sale or traffic
of intoxicating liquors.
Scant authority in Illinois appears to support the contention that the
Liquor Control Act in no way embraces the proposition that non-
commercial dispensers of intoxicants are meant to be included within
the Act.
On the other hand, another line of authority apparently ignores the
question as to whether the Act applies to non-commercial dispensers and
maintains instead that the mere giving of liquor as an act of courtesy
does not render the donor host liable for civil damages. Perhaps the most
widely cited case on this subject is Cruse v. Aden.1 s In that case the
court refused to hold the defendant host liable because the deceased had
a few drinks with the defendant at the defendant's home. The Cruse Case,
as cited, supports the proposition that the word "giving" in the Act is
not intended to apply to purely social drinking situations. However, a
close reading of the case reveals that the court said substantially more:
"[S] ection 9 of the Dram Shop Act does not apply to persons who are
not, either directly or indirectly, or in any way or to any extent, engaged
in the liquor traffic, and that the right of action given by said section . . .
is not intended to be given against a person who, in his own house, or
elsewhere, gives a glass of intoxicating liquor to a friend as a mere act
of courtesy and politeness, and without any purpose or expectation of
15 78 Ill. 510 (1875).
16 Albrecht v. People, 78 Ill. 510 (1875).
17 168 Ill. App. 298 (1912). An information was filed against the defendant for
selling intoxicating liquors in violation of statute. The defendant maintained a
summer residence where he kept Intoxicating liquor for the use of his family, him-
self, and for the entertainment of his guests. Occasionally, beer was purchased
from persons on the premises. A finding of guilty was reversed on the theory that
the defendant was not in the liquor business.
18 See note 6, ante.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
pecuniary gain or profit.' 19 (Italics added.) In later cases, courts have
reached substantially the same result.
20
In spite of the broad declaration of legislative intent, it would appear
that to impose liability upon individual non-commercial dispensers of
alcoholic beverages, the aggrieved party must overcome the reported au-
thorities. It should be noted, however, that no case has been reported
in Illinois upon this question involving corporate hosts. The limited
number of cases does not make it entirely clear whether civil damages can
be imposed on persons indirectly involved in the supplying of intoxicat-
ing beverages or to persons who have a purpose or expectation of pecuniary
gain or profit.
Illinois courts have yet to determine the problem as to whether a
corporate host who holds an office "Christmas Party" or conducts a
"Hospitality Suite" will be called upon to respond in civil damages.
It is not entirely safe, however, for a corporate host to disregard the
effects of the Liquor Control Act. There are indications among the lower
echelons of legal activity that courts may be willing to affix liability upon
a corporate host by virtue of the fact that the free dispensing of alcoholic
beverages by a non-commercial dispenser such as a corporation does
engage in quasi-social activities for a purpose and often with the expecta-
tion of gain or profit.
21
There are other considerations which enter into the question of
liability of corporate hosts which presumably are persuasive argument in
favor of the aggrieved party. The very existence of commercial insurance
policies, specifically indemnifying a corporate host for any liability under
the Liquor Control Act, is indicative that the balance of judicial opinion
as to whether liability will or will not be imposed is extremely tenuous.
22
19 Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N. E. 73 (1889).
20 Blackwell v. Fernandez, 324 Ill. App. 597, 59 N. E. (2d) 342 (1945) ; Walker
v. Dailey, 101 I1. App. 575 (1901) ; Freeze v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873).
21 Taylor v. Maywood Motor Co., Cook County Circuit Court, No. 56C 14432.
22 Illustrative of a form of commercial host liability insurance is one sold by the
Continental Casualty Company of Chicago, Illinois which reads in part as follows:
INsuRIG AGREEMENTS
"I. Coverage
To indemnify the insured against all sums for the payment of which by reason
of Sections 14 and 15 of Article VI of an Act of the General Assembly of the
State of Illinois, entitled 'An Act relating to alcoholic liquors' in force February
1, 1934, and all laws amendatory thereof, (herein referred to as Illinois Liquor
Control Act) the Insured, or the Insured's interest in the Premises described
in Item 3 of the Declarations shall become legally liable (whether in Insured's
own right or in any fiduciary capacity) to any one who shall, during the policy
period, be injured in person or property, or means of support by any intoxi-
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Text writers on the subject of Dram Shop insurance have said: "It is
expected that, in the not too distant future, Dram Shop insurance ques-
tions will compose a sizeable group of decisions. That type of insurance,
as such, is comparatively new. It has become exceedingly popular, how-
ever, in States possessing Dram Shop Acts, and the type of exclusions
contained in such policies make it apparent that litigation is bound to
arise . . .. It may be anticipated, however, that the Courts, particularly
if they have sentiment against the sale of intoxicating liquors, or the cir-
cumstances of the case are rather gross, will be rather liberal with the
funds of the insurer. "23
In addition to the existence of insurance other so-called persuasive
elements seeking to impose liability upon a corporate host are permitted
cated person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, provided the
Licensee(s) named in Item 1 of the Declarations shall have caused the intoxi-
cation, in whole or in part, of such person by the selling or giving of alcoholic
liquor in the Premises described in Item 3 of the Declarations.
"II. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Payment8
As respects such Insurance as is afforded by the other terms of this policy, the
Company shall
(A) Upon receipt of notice of any occurrence likely to give rise to a claim
under this policy, defend, in the name and on behalf of the Insured, and
at the cost of the Company, any civil action which may be brought
against the Insured, on account of any claim, even if groundless for
which the Company would be liable to the Insured if sustained; but the
Company shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiations,
settlement or compromise of any claim or suit as may be deemed ex-
pedient by the Company; and
(B) Pay all costs taxed against the Insured in any civil action defended by
the Company, and any interest upon that part of the judgment for which
the Company is liable under this policy, accruing up to the date the Com-
pany has paid, tendered, or deposited in Court the amount for which
the Company is liable.
"III. Definition of 'Insured'
The word 'Insured' shall include only the following:
(A) The 'owner,' as described in Item I(A) of the Declarations, who shall
be any person owning, renting, leasing or permitting the occupation of
the Premises, either in his own right or in any fiduciary capacity, or
having charge thereof as agent, general lessee, or receiver, but does not
include any person engaged in the sale of alcoholic liquors. The terms
of this policy, including all conditions and exclusions, applicable to a
Licensee shall apply to an insured engaged in selling or giving alcoholic
liquors in Premises owned by him;
(B) The 'Licensee' as described in Item I(B) of the Declarations, who shall
be any person, firm or corporation duly licensed to carry on the business
of selling alcoholic liquors in the Premises, in accordance with all laws
and ordinances in force where such Premises are located.
In the event of the death, insolvency or bankruptcy of any Insured,
such Insurance as is afforded by this policy shall apply to the legal
representatives of such Insured, provided, that written notice of the
event Is furnished to Geo. F. Brown & Sons, Inc., 175 W. Jackson Blvd.,
Chicago 4, Illinois, within 30 days thereafter."
23 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, § 4507 (1942).
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tax deductions, 24 as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses. Such
expenses, of course, must bear some relation to the taxpayer's business and
must be of a character reasonably expected to benefit the business. Ex-
penses for Office Christmas Parties have been determined as an ordinary
-and necessary expense. 25  The presence of a deduction such as this may
fall within the language of the Cruse and Kryl Cases as previously
indicated.
Despite reported decisions touching on the matter of non-commercial
host liability, in the face of the legislative intent and other persuasive
elements, it seems reasonable to conclude a corporate host who conducts
an Office Christmas Party or Hospitality Room serving intoxicating bever-
ages will find itself subject to civil damages as a tortfeasor under the
Liquor Control Act.
G. C. HELDRICH, JR.
24 Treas. Reg., § 1.162-1 (1954).
25 CCH. 1959 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., Vol. 1, 1340.2681; 1340.269; f 1340.271;
1340.2715.
